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Abstract 
Denial-of-Service (DoS) and Distributed DoS (DDoS) 
attacks can cause serious problems in wireless networks due 
to limited network and host resources. Attacker traceback is 
a promising solution to take a proper countermeasure near 
the attack origins, to discourage attackers from launching 
attacks, and for forensics. However, attacker traceback in 
Mobile Ad-hoc Networks (MANETs) is a challenging 
problem due to the dynamic topology, and limited network 
resources. It is especially difficult to trace back attacker(s) 
when they are moving to avoid traceback. In this paper, we 
introduce the ATTENTION protocol framework, which 
pays special attention to MAC layer abnormal activity under 
attack. ATTENTION consists of three classes, namely, 
coarse-grained traceback, fine-grained traceback and spatio-
temporal fusion architecture. For energy-efficient attacker 
searching in MANETs, we also utilize small-world model. 
Our simulation analysis shows 79% of success rate in DoS 
attacker traceback with coarse-grained attack signature. In 
addition, with fine-grained attack signature, it shows 97% of 
success rate in DoS attacker traceback and 83% of success 
rate in DDoS attacker traceback. We also show that 
ATTENTION has robustness against node collusion and 
mobility. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The different types of denial of service attacks can be 
broadly classified into software exploits and flooding attacks. 
In software exploits, the attacker sends a few packets to 
exercise specific software bugs within the target’s OS or 
application, disabling or harming the victim. On the other 
hand, in flooding attacks, one or more attackers send 
incessant streams of packets aimed at overwhelming link 
bandwidth or computing resources at the victim. In this 
paper, we mainly focus on flooding-type DoS/DDoS attack 
since it cannot be fixed with software debugging. 
In flooding-type DoS/DDoS attack, attacker transmits a 
large number of packets towards victim with spoofed source 
address. For instance, in SYN Flood [2], at least 200-500 
pps of SYN packets are transmitted to a single victim. UDP 
Echo-Chargen [4] and Smurf [3] also attacks victim using a 
large amount of packets with spoofed address. It is reported 
that DoS attack occurs more than 4,000 times per week and 
more than 600,000 pps of attack packets are used for attack 
in some cases [15]. In general, we can say the following 
characteristics of flooding-type DoS/DDoS attacks: (I) 
Traffic volume is abnormally increased during attack period. 
(II) Attackers routinely disguise their location using 
incorrect/spoofed addresses. (III) Such attacks may persist 
for tens of minutes and in some case for several days [1].  
There are several IP traceback schemes proposed for 
the Internet such as packet marking [17][18], logging [16], 
ICMP traceback [7], etc [6]. Such traceback schemes 
developed for the fixed networks are not directly applicable 
to MANETs due to the following peculiar characteristics of 
MANETs: (1) In MANETs, there is no fixed infrastructure. 
Each node works as an autonomous terminal, acting as both 
host and a router. (2) Each node moves in and out, 
frequently changing network topology. (3) In general, 
network bandwidth and battery power are severely limited 
in MANETs compared to wired networks. (4) A node in 
MANETs has limited trust. 
To perform efficient DoS/DDoS attacker traceback 
under such a harsh environment in MANETs, we specially 
pay attention to MAC layer abnormal activity under attack. 
Under flooding-type DoS/DDoS attack, abnormal activities 
(e.g., increased backoff time, increased number of frames, 
increased collision, etc) to access limited wireless medium 
are observed by many overhearing nodes around the attack 
path. We statistically characterize the MAC layer 
abnormality that is observed during DoS/DDoS attack and 
use the abnormality as attack signature for traceback. The 
attack signature is consistently observed on the attack path 
from attacker to victim, which enables us to track down 
attacker. The merits of MAC layer abnormality-based 
attacker traceback are multifold. First, we can track down 
attacker in spite of address spoofing using MAC 
abnormality-based attack signature. Second, the attack 
signature is observed by many neighbor nodes sharing the 
medium through overhearing. This overhearing can be 
efficiently used (i.e., majority voting) to prevent 
false/malicious reporting by compromised node or inside 
attacker. In addition, overhearing can be used for attacker 
traceback under node mobility. In MANETs, nodes 
frequently move in and out changing network topology. 
When a node that relayed attack traffic moves out, it is hard 
to trace back attack origin. In such case, we can use 
information from the nodes that overhear and stay in the 
region around attack path for traceback.  
 Another contribution of this paper is the analysis and 
traceback of mobile attackers. One of the main challenges 
in attacker traceback in MANETs is the mobility of nodes. 
Existing IP traceback schemes cannot be directly applied to 
MANETs under the presence of node mobility. When the 
attacker moves, this may confuse the victim between DDoS 
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attack and mobile attack, which makes traceback fail. To 
track down mobile attacker, we introduce spatio-temporal 
fusion architecture. In the spatio-temporal fusion 
architecture, the relative location of attacker is estimated 
using multi-dimensional information, which is spatial and 
temporal information of attack signature. In addition, DDoS 
attack and mobile attack are effectively distinguished using 
spatio-temporal fusion architecture.  
 We summarize the contributions of this paper as follows. 
 We propose a novel MAC layer abnormality detection 
mechanism that is effectively used as attack signatures 
with statistical characterization. We provide 
mechanisms robust to address spoofing, intermediate 
node collusion and false reporting. Further, we 
introduce the spatio-temporal fusion architecture; the 
first for mobile attacker detection. 
 We provide two classes of traceback schemes (i.e., 
coarse-grained and fine grained) that are effective in 
both DoS and DDoS attacker traceback with low 
communication/processing overhead. 
 We performe extensive simulation, with a rich set of 
scenarios, to validate the effectiveness of proposed 
protocol framework. Our results show a very high 
detection capability for DoS, DDoS and mobility cases. 
 
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we 
briefly describe related IP traceback schemes. In section 3, 
we provide architecture overview of our proposal. In section 
4 and 5 we provide two classes of attacker traceback 
schemes: coarse-grained traceback and fine-grained 
traceback. In section 6, we provide mobile attacker 
traceback architecture, which is spatio-temporal fusion 
architecture. Then, we present simulation results in section 7 
and discussion and conclusion are provided in section 8 and 
section 9, respectively. 
2. RELATED WORK 
 
The method in [8] using controlled flooding tests 
network links between routers to determine the origin of the 
attack traffic. Downstream node intentionally sends a burst 
of network traffic to the upstream network segments. At the 
same time, it checks incoming attack traffic for any changes. 
From the changes and frequency of the incoming attack 
traffic, the victim can determine which upstream router the 
attack traffic is coming from. The same process is continued 
a level higher until finally reaching the attacker. Since this is 
a reactive method, the trace needs to be completed before 
the attack is over. 
Packet Marking [17][18], and ICMP Traceback 
Message (iTrace) [7] attempt to distribute the burden of 
storing state and performing computation for IP traceback at 
the end hosts rather than in the network. For instance, in 
ICMP-based notification, router generates ICMP message 
containing information regarding where each packet came 
from and where it was sent. Then, routers notify the packet 
destination of their presence on the route. Collection of these 
messages can be used to trace the attack origin. ICMP 
traceback message uses ICMP but limits to generating ICMP 
message for every 20,000 packets (recommended). In 
Probabilistic Packet Marking (PPM), routers insert 
traceback data into each packet probabilistically so the 
number of packets that are marked at each router is enough 
for the reconstruction of attack path at the victim.  
Logging scheme requires the routers to log meta-data in 
case an incoming packet proves to be offensive. Audited 
packet flow is logged at various points throughout the 
network and then used for appropriate extraction techniques 
to discover the packet’s path through the network. To 
reduce the size of packet log and provide confidentiality, 
hash-based logging is proposed [16]. 
The existing schemes developed for the Internet are not 
directly applicable to MANETs due to the following 
reasons: (I) Intermediate relay nodes in MANETs can move 
in/out and may fail due to power outage, frequently 
changing network topology. In addition, each node in 
MANETs has limited trust due to the autonomous nature of 
nodes. Hence, traceback schemes that purely rely on relay 
nodes are problematic in terms of robustness and trust. (II) 
Storage capacity of each node is limited in MANETs. In 
packet marking and logging, large amount of per-packet 
information needs to be stored at either end-host or inside 
the network. (III) Existing schemes incur high processing 
load for attack path reconstruction. For instance, in iTrace, 
end host first searches the database, which stores path 
information of packets. Then, based on the per-packet 
information, end-host should run reconstruction algorithm 
to find out attack path. On the other hand, controlled 
flooding consumes a lot of bandwidth for traceback, which 
is highly undesirable in bandwidth-constrained MANETs.  
SWAT [12,13] is the first traceback protocol developed 
for MANETs. SWAT consists of two main building blocks: 
Traffic pattern/volume matching and small world 
construction. It uses Traffic Pattern Matching (TPM) and 
Traffic Volume Matching (TVM) techniques to deal with 
address spoofing problem and utilize small-world model for 
efficient search. However, SWAT has the following 
drawbacks: (1) It cannot successfully trace back attacker 
when there exists high volume of background traffic. (2) 
SWAT fails to track down distributed DoS attackers. (3) 
SWAT also shows weakness under node collusion and false 
reporting since it relays only on relay nodes of attack traffic 
for traceback. (4) SWAT does not handle node mobility 
problems. 
3. ARCHITECTURE OVERVIEW 
 
When DoS/DDoS attack is detected by intrusion 
detection system, a victim initiates traceback process. The 
first step of traceback process is to characterize attack 
signature. The attack signature is characterized by two 
different classes: coarse-grained signature and fine-grained 
signature. In coarse-grained signature, attack is 
characterized by regional abnormality of MAC layer 
activity (increased busy time, increased frames, or increased 
collision, etc.). In fine-grained signature, attack signature is 
characterized by link-level abnormality using frame content 
information. There exists tradeoff between coarse-grained 
traceback (ATTENTION-CT) and fine-grained traceback 
(ATTENTION-FT). In coarse-grained traceback, we ignore 
content-level details. The fundamental assumption in coarse-
grained traceback is that during DoS/DDoS attacks the 
regional wireless medium around attack path is heavily and 
abnormally loaded. This is generally true in bandwidth-
constrained wireless networks. The abnormality is 
statistically characterized as attack signature and used for 
traceback. The advantage of coarse-grained traceback is that 
it is simple and computationally light to analyze attack 
traffic and perform traceback. The disadvantage is that it 
does not work in case the regional wireless medium is not 
abnormally loaded. Especially, in DDoS case, regional 
abnormality is low near the attack origins since only small 
amount of attack traffic is generated by each distributed 
attacker. In fine-grained traceback, content information such 
as previous hop MAC address, and next hop MAC address 
is used for traceback to filter out background traffic that 
does not contribute attack traffic. The obvious advantage is 
that we can trace back attacker even if there is low regional 
abnormality. On the other hand, the disadvantage is that it 
requires more computation overhead and memory for 
traceback. 
Once the attack signature is characterized by the 
framework, victim node initiates efficient search process. By 
finding nodes in the neighbor, which observe similar or 
same attack signature, we can find the nodes that relayed the 
attack traffic. The process is continued recursively from the 
neighbor nodes of victim back to the attack origin. For 
efficient attacker searching, we use small world model. 
Helmy [10][11] found that path length in wireless networks 
is drastically reduced by adding a few random links 
(resembling a small world). These random links need not be 
totally random, but in fact may be confined to small fraction 
of the network diameter, thus reducing the overhead of 
creating such network. The random links can be established 
using contacts [11]. We effectively extend the contact 
architecture adding security functionality. Contact nodes are 
a set of nodes outside the vicinity, which are used as short-
cut to build small world and provide wide view on entire 
network to the victim. Our contact selection scheme follows 
[11]. However, the functionality of contacts in 
ATTENTION are distinct, which will be articulated in Sec.4, 
5, and 6. 
V : V i c t i m   n o d e 
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[Figure 1] Each node has vicinity of radius R hops. A victim 
sends query with attack signature to its vicinity nodes and 
border nodes Bi. Then, the border nodes choose one of its 
borders Ci, to be the contact and sends query with attack 
signature. 
As shown in Fig.1, victim node, V, sends queries with 
attack signature to its vicinity nodes (nodes within radius R) 
and contacts (C1, C2, and C3). To send to the contacts, the 
victim node chooses three borders, B1, B2 and B3, to which 
it sends the queries. The borders in turn choose three 
contacts at r hops away to which the borders forward the 
queries. If there is no node that observed (relayed or 
overheard) attack signature, it suppresses query. Otherwise, 
it sends next level query to the contact of contact. In doing 
so, we can perform directional search for DoS attacker 
traceback and multi-directional search for DDoS attacker 
traceback, where the search process has directionality 
towards attacker(s). Directional and multi-directional search 
significantly reduces communication overhead. We will 
verify the reduction in the simulation section. 
To track down mobile attackers, we introduce spatio-
temporal fusion architecture. The spatio-temporal fusion 
architecture consists of information gathering, and 
information fusion processes. These functionalities are 
implemented in contact architecture. Contact node gathers 
spatial/temporal attack information from its vicinity nodes. 
Then the information is correlated and classified in 
information fusion process. That is, movement of attacker is 
detected by correlating spatial/temporal continuity of attack 
signature movement. Fig. 2 summarizes the spatio-temporal 
fusion architecture and the detailed mechanism is explained 
in section 6. 
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[Figure 2] Building blocks of spatio-temporal fusion 
architecture for mobile attacker traceback 
 
4. COARSE-GRAINED TRACEBACK 
 
Coarse-grained traceback consists of two phases. (I) In 
the first phase, we statistically characterize MAC layer 
abnormality (e.g., increased backoff time, increased number 
of Data/ACK/RTS frames, increased collision, etc), which 
is observed during attack. We define the abnormality as 
attack signature. The attack signature is consistently 
observed along the attack path from attacker to victim. (II) 
The second phase is an efficient search of intermediate 
nodes and attack origin using the attack signature. 
 
4.1 MAC Abnormality Characterization Process 
 
Once flooding-type DoS/DDoS attack is launched, a 
large volume of traffic is generated towards a victim to 
disable or harm network bandwidth or host resources. 
Consequently, we can observe abnormal MAC layer activity 
to capture medium and send large volume of packets. The 
abnormality is observed by neighbor nodes overhearing 
around the attack path. In this paper, we use 802.11 MAC 
mechanism, which is widely used for layer of MANETs and 
classify MAC layer activity into several components. Note 
that our scheme can be generally applied to other MAC 
protocols. Based on the classification, we analyze how the 
attack traffic causes abnormality in each component. 
In the 802.11 protocol, the fundamental mechanism to 
access a medium is called Distributed Coordination 
Function (DCF). The DCF standard combines Carrier Sense 
Multiple Access/Collision Avoidance (CSMA/CA) with 
Request to Send/Clear to Send (RTS/CTS) handshake to 
avoid collisions. It works as follows: A node can only 
transmit when no carrier of a transmitting node is sensed in 
the vicinity. Otherwise, it has to defer its own transmission 
until the channel is determined to be idle. The node then 
requests channel by sending an RTS to the receiver, which, 
in turn, replies with a CTS. The nodes in the vicinity 
overhearing the RTS or CTS defer their own transmission 
for a period that is long enough for the subsequent 
DATA/ACK exchange. When the RTS/CTS handshake is 
completed, the sender commences data transmission. The 
receiver acknowledges the data with an ACK. If no CTS or 
ACK is received, the sender exponentially backs off, and 
retransmits the RTS or DATA. Under DoS/DDoS attack, we 
can observe several abnormalities. 
 
 Increased collisions 
Increased collision can be inferred by several symptoms. 
(I) Increased retry count due to lack of ACK or CTS: frame 
or fragment has a single retry counter associated with it. 
Frames that are shorter than the RTS threshold have short 
retry count. Frames that are longer than the threshold are 
considered long frames and have long retry count. Frame 
retry counts begin at 0 and are incremented when a frame 
transmission fails. (II) Large contention window (CW). 
After each unsuccessful transmission, CW is doubled up to a 
maximum value CWmax = 2
m
*CWmin, where m is the number 
of attempt. (III) Long lifetime: when the first fragment is 
transmitted, the lifetime counter is started. When the lifetime 
limit is reached, the frame is discarded and no attempt is 
made to transmit any remaining fragments.  
 
 Increased busy time  
 A node monitors channel to check whether it is idle or 
not. If it is busy less than certain time interval, it cannot go 
into backoff stage and should defer. Frequent busy time and 
consequent transition from backoff state to defer stage are 
considered as symptom of heavy traffic. 
 
 Increased frames 
As attack packets are increased, the number of 
corresponding data frames and ACK are increased. In 
addition, to access channel, the number of RTS and CTS 
frames are also increased. 
 
We performed simulation to verify the abnormal 
behavior of MAC layer under DoS attack. We used ns-2 for 
simulation with 50 nodes. The network size is 670m X 
670m and DSDV is used for underlying routing protocol. 
Average distance between attacker and victim is 4 hops. In 
Fig.3, we varied the number of nodes that generate 
background traffic from 1 to 25 and measured the increase 
rate. Increase rate is defined as the ratio between abnormal 
behavior and normal behavior. For instance, when collision 
count under attack is η and collision count under normal 
background traffic is η’, the increase rate is calculated as 
η/η’. In the simulation, attack traffic is generated as ten 
times of normal traffic size. As shown in the Fig.3, frame 
count and busy time show high increase rate when 
background traffic is low, and the increase rate decrease as 
background traffic increases. It is because as background 
traffic increases the attack traffic does not show drastic 
abnormality. On the other hand, in collision, increase rate is 
low when background traffic is low. It is because when 
there exists only attack traffic, collision rarely occurs. The 
increase rate of collision gradually goes up as background 
traffic increases and decreases after certain point. As we can 
see in Fig.3, there is clear MAC abnormality when 
background traffic is reasonable range. The abnormality is 
used for attacker traceback in ATTENTION. 
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[Figure 3] Abnormal increase of MAC activity component 
 
We first define the abnormality of MAC activity as the 
value that is outside the normal interval. Each node samples 
the MAC activity information (e.g., increased collision, 
busy time, frames, etc.) as time series data, (x1,x2,…xn). 
Sampling number is chosen large enough to reflect the 
average network usage pattern and unit time for 
abnormality monitoring is chosen as 10 seconds in our 
scheme. After reaching maximum sampling number, the 
sampling process wraps to zero and start again. Based on 
the collected samples and using pivotal method [19], we 
calculate the normal interval with the confidence interval 
100(1-α)% as follows. 
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Where, 
nx  is the sample mean and σ is the standard 
deviation. Since the value of σ is unknown, the sample 
standard deviation sn is used.  
The mean and variance is calculated and updated as 
follows: The average 
nx of the time series data given n 
points is obtained as follows  
∑=
n
in x
n
x
1
1 (Eq.2) 
If a new point xn+1 is measured and it is within normal range, 
we can recompute
nx , but it is more efficient to use the old 
value of 
nx  and make a small correction using xn+1. The 
correction is easy to derive, since, 
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And so, 1+nx  can be written as 
 
)(
1
1
1
111 nnnnnn xxKxx
n
x
n
n
x −+=
+
+
+
= +++ (Eq.4) 
Where, K=1/n+1 as gain factor. The gain K adjusts how big 
the correction will be. We can also recalculate recursively 
the quadratic standard deviation  (variance) of the time 
series data. Given n points, the quadratic standard deviation 
is given by: 
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If a new point xn+1 is measured, the new variance is  
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The whole expression reduces to 
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(Eq.7) 
The whole process can now be cast into as a series of steps 
to be followed iteratively. Given the first n points, and our 
calculation of 
nx and ns , then 
 
(1) When a new point xn+1 is measured, we compute the 
gain factor K=1/(n+1). 
(2) We compute the new estimation of the average 
)( 11 nnnn xxKxx −+= ++ (Eq.8) 
(3) We compute also a provisional estimate of the new 
standard deviation 
2
1
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(4) Then, we find the correct 
1+ns  using the correction 
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(5) Finally, we calculate the normal range 
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The iterative computation is used for updating average, 
standard deviation and consequent normal range. When the 
new value is outside the normal range, we define it as 
abnormality. The time series data, (x1,x2,…xn) which is 
outside the normal range is defined as attack signature and 
used for traceback. Each node monitors MAC layer activity 
to detect the abnormality. Once the abnormality is observed, 
a node characterize the abnormality as attack signature and 
it is logged for traceback. The abnormal range is excluded 
from calculating normal range. 
To find optimal indication factor for attack signature, 
we use statistical test (categorical data analysis) [19]. The 
optimal indicator should possess the following property: 
“Majority of neighbor nodes around the attack path observe 
abnormal MAC activity”. We use two-way contingency 
table to evaluate the dependency of MAC layer activity on 
attack traffic. In two-way contingency table, data is 
classified according to the direction (row and column) of 
classification, according to two qualitative variables. In our 
test, row is the normal/abnormal and column is attack 
region/non-attack region as in table 1. Attack region is the 
area around the attack path where nodes can overhear attack 
traffic activity. In the contents of table, the number of nodes 
that observes corresponding MAC layer abnormality is 
written. N is the total number of nodes in the networks. 
 
[Table 1] Two-way contingency table 
 
 Non-attack 
region 
Attack 
region 
Totals 
Normal n11 n12 n1. 
Abnormal n21 n22 n2. 
Totals n.1 n.2 N 
 
Then, we set the following null and alternative 
hypothesis to test the dependency of two classifications.  
 
H0: The two classifications are independent 
Ha: The two classifications are dependent 
Test statistic: ∑∑
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)(ˆ = , ni. is total for row i and n.j is total for 
column j. The rejection region where we can conclude that 
two classifications are dependent is as follow. 
22
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Where χ
2 
is chi-square probability distribution with (r-1)(c-1) 
degree of freedom and α is the probability of a type I error (a type 
I error is made if H0 is rejected when H0 is true). Intuitively, χ
2 
shows high value as the percentage of nodes that observes 
abnormality increases. 
In Fig.4, we show the χ
2
 value of each abnormality 
component. The threshold χα
2
 is 5.02 with 97.5% 
confidence interval. We can infer that if the χ
2
 value is 
above the threshold, there exists dependency (reject the null 
hypothesis H0). As shown in the Fig.4, when the number of 
nodes that generates background traffic is low (less than 
10% of entire network nodes), the dependency of frame 
count and busy time on attack is high. As background traffic 
increases the dependency is decreased since there is little 
difference between attack traffic and background traffic. On 
the other hand, the dependency of collision on attack is low 
when background traffic is low since there is only small 
background traffic that collides with attack traffic. When 
the background traffic is high (above 30), the dependency is 
low. It is because there is only little difference between 
attack traffic and background traffic. In other region, we can 
constantly observe high χ
2
 value (χ
2
>χα
2
), which means that 
attack traffic have clear impact (dependency) on the 
overhearing nodes around attack route. 
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[Figure 4] Dependency of MAC layer activity on attack 
 
4.2 Abnormality Matching using KS test 
 
 We are interested in using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
(KS) statistic Dn [18] to test the hypothesis that the two 
abnormality, Fn(x), F0(x) is matching. F0(x) corresponds to 
reference abnormality, which is included in query message, 
and Fn(x) is the candidate abnormality observed by vicinity 
nodes.  
 
]|)()(|[sup 0 xFxFD nxn −=      (Eq.13)         
 
H0 : Fn(x)=F0(x) 
Ha : Fn(x) ≠F0(x) 
 
We accept H0 if the distribution function Fn(x) is sufficiently 
close to F0(x), that is, if the value of Dn is sufficiently small. 
The hypothesis H0 is rejected if the observed value of Dn is 
greater than the selected critical value that depends on the 
desired significance level and sample size. When the H0 is 
accepted (sufficiently similar), we can infer that the 
abnormality is matching, meaning that the attack traffic is 
traversed the two contact region. In our scheme, when there 
are multiple matching results, we select the one, which 
shows the smallest Dn value as the attack traffic relay region. 
This process is performed recursively from level-1 contacts 
towards attack origin.  
 
4.3 Attacker Searching Process 
 
We describe the DoS attack traceback scheme as 
follows: (1) when a victim node, V, detects attack such as 
SYN flooding, it first extracts attack signature described by 
MAC layer abnormality. It then sends a query to the nodes 
within its vicinity and level-1 contacts specifying the depth 
of search (D) large enough to detect an attacker. The query 
contains sequence number (SN) and attack signature. (2) As 
the query is forwarded, each node traversed records the SN, 
and V. If a node receives a request with the same SN and V, 
it drops the query. This provides for loop prevention and 
avoidance of re-visits to the covered parts of the network. (3) 
In case KS test is passed, meaning that there exist vicinity 
nodes of contacts that observe similar attack signature, the 
first step of trace is completed. For instance, victim (V) 
sends query to the vicinity nodes and 2 level-1 Contacts 
(CL_1a and CL_1b) around the victim in Fig. 5 
(transmission arrows to vicinity nodes by each contact are 
omitted in the figure). Then, one level-1 (CL_1b) contact 
reports to the victim that some of its vicinity nodes 
observed low Dn value in KS test. (4) Next, only the contact, 
CL_1b, that observes traffic signature matching in its 
vicinity sends next level query to level-2 contacts (CL_2c, 
and CL_2d) with the partial attack path appended to the 
query. It also reduces D by 1. This processing by contact is 
called in-network processing. Other contacts that do not 
have relay nodes of attack traffic in their vicinities, suppress 
forwarding the query (query suppression). This results in 
directional search towards the attacker. (5) When there is 
no more contact report or no other nodes outside the 
vicinity, the last contact (CL_2c) reports the complete attack 
route to the victim.  
Our scheme is based on majority voting. That is, even 
if some nodes move out from the attack route or are 
compromised by attackers, we can still find an attack route 
using available information from good nodes staying in the 
vicinity. This majority voting becomes possible in 
ATTENTION since MAC layer abnormality is observed by 
many overhearing nodes around attack path.  
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[Figure 5] Victim (V) sends queries with attack signature to the 
first level contacts, (CL_1a, CL_1b). Only CL_1b that observed 
matching traffic signature within vicinity sends next level 
queries to level-2 contacts (CL_2c, CL_2d). CL_1a suppresses 
further query. CL_2c sends final attack route to the victim. 
5. FINE-GRAINED TRACEBACK 
 
There are several drawbacks of coarse-grained 
traceback scheme. First, if the attack traffic does not show 
regional abnormality, it is difficult to trace back attacker 
using coarse-grained abnormality matching. Especially in 
DDoS attack, attacker orchestrates attack so that each 
distributed node contributes only small portion of attack 
traffic to the victim. Second, if there exists a large amount 
of background traffic, attack traffic shows low matching 
level (high Dn in KS test) along the attack path. The 
fundamental problem of coarse-grained traceback is that 
simple count information of regional MAC layer 
abnormality includes a lot of noise factors by background 
traffic. It is necessary to capture fine-grained traffic 
information to filter out the noise factors for more accurate 
traceback. We introduce fine-grained traceback scheme, 
which utilizes content information inside frame. Fine-
grained traceback consists of two phases: (1) Link-level 
abnormality detection (2) Directional noise reduction  
Each node monitors link-level abnormality instead of 
region-level abnormality. That is, a node monitors 
abnormality with the tuple (Src_addr, Dest_addr, Ф), where 
Src_addr is the MAC address of sender and Dest_addr is the 
MAC address of destination, which is observed by 
relay/overhearing nodes. Note that MAC layer information 
is not susceptible to network layer spoofing (e.g., source IP 
address) by attacker. We assume that intermediate nodes, 
which only relay traffic, do not spoof its own MAC 
addresses. Ф is the time series of number of frames (i.e., 
(N1,N2,…,Nt), Ni=the number of frames at time slot i) from 
Src_addr to Dest_addr during last time frame [0,t]. If one of 
links shows abnormality, which is outside the normal range 
(Eq.11), it logs the attack signature. Link-level abnormality 
has the following advantages: (I) It captures the abnormality 
more sensitively compared to region-level monitoring since 
link-level traffic includes smaller background traffic. (II) 
The matching test shows more accurate result since noise 
factors caused by background traffic are reduced.  
In addition, fine-grained signature filters out directional 
noise, through relay continuity discovery. Relay continuity 
discovery is the process to find the list of continuous nodes 
that relayed attack traffic. Let (Src_addri, Dest_addri, Фi) be 
the observation by node i and (Src_addrj, Dest_addrj, Фj) be 
the observation by node j. When Src_addrj = Dest_addri and 
ξi≈ ξi, we can infer that attack traffic is relayed from node i 
to node j. The nodes that do not have continuity which 
ultimately end up at the victim are excluded in the 
traceback. Note that the continuity discovery process only 
checks local continuity. Hence, it does not completely 
exclude traffic that is not ultimately heading to the victim. 
However, we can reduce much noise by eliminating the 
links that do not have relay continuity.  
Under DDoS attack, attack traffic is merged in various 
parts of networks or at the victim. Hence, partial attack 
traffic should be detected for distributed attacker traceback. 
To find the partial attack traffic, we perform the following 
combinational matching test: Let Фi, Фj, and Фk be the time-
series data, which shows abnormality and has continuity to 
the victim. We call the time-series data, which shows 
abnormality, as candidate attack signature. Then, 
combinational abnormality matching test is performed 
between the time-wise summation of each combination of 
candidate attack signatures and attack signature ξ. There can 
be S number of combinations from K (3 in the example) 
candidate attack signatures as follows.  
∑
=
=
K
i
iKCS
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(Eq.14)         
We find the distributed attack route by finding high 
matching level between each combination and attack 
signature (e.g., Фi+Фj ≈ξ). Since attack signature is formed 
by the partial attack traffic, background traffic is to be 
excluded through the combinational matching test.  
Overall fine-grained attacker traceback scheme to track 
down DDoS attackers is explained as follows. (1) First, a 
victim node identifies attack signature. Unlike DoS attack, 
attack signature of DDoS attack consists of multiple 
signatures that come from different neighbors of the victim. 
That is, the victim, identifies multiple attack signatures (Ф1, 
Ф2,…,Фn), which come from different sources (i.e., 
Src_addr1, Src_addr2,…, Src_addrn) during attack period t. 
(2) Once the attack signatures are identified, search process 
begins with relay continuity discovery. That is the victim 
sends attack signature matching query to its vicinity nodes 
and level-1 contacts. Candidate find-grained attack 
signatures that have continuity are returned to the victim. 
(3) Then victim performs attack signature matching test 
between the links that has continuity. Note that, unlike DoS 
attacker traceback, matching test should be done at the 
victim node.  (4) If there exist multiple sender nodes that 
are sending abnormal traffic to the same destination, we can 
infer that attack traffic is merging and matching test should 
done between each combinations of candidate attack 
signature and attack signature. (5) The combination of 
candidate attack signature that shows the highest matching 
level becomes new branch attack signature. (6) The process 
is recursively repeated towards attack origins  
Note that DoS attacker can also be traced back with 
fine-grained signature, which may increase traceback 
success rate. However, it incurs increased processing load 
and memory overhead. 
6. MOBILE ATTACKER TRACEBACK 
 
In MANETs, nodes move changing network topology. 
DoS/DDoS attack under such a mobile scenario causes 
several problems/illusions in traceback. (I) When attacker 
changes its location and performs DoS attack, victim might 
confuse mobile attack as DDoS attack, which leads to false 
traceback result. To distinguish DDoS attack and mobile 
attack, we take age information into consideration. Age is 
defined as the first and last (or most recent) time (tS, tL) the 
abnormality is observed. In addition, we introduce spatial 
continuity and temporal continuity detection for mobile 
attacker traceback. (II) We need to estimate the current 
location of attacker to take proper countermeasure near the 
attack origin and for forensics. We introduce relative 
attacker positioning mechanism, which does not require 
geographic information. We assume majority of 
intermediate nodes, which overhears attack signature stays 
in the vicinity of attack route. We call our mobile attacker 
traceback system as spatio-temporal fusion architecture. 
The basic step is explained as follows. 
 
(1) Once attack is detected by intrusion detection system, 
victim initiates traceback process by sending attack 
signature queries to its contacts. 
(2) Contact, in turn, sends queries to its vicinity nodes to 
find the nodes that observed abnormality. The nodes that 
detect the abnormality report the attack signature with age 
information to the contact.  
(3) The contact aggregates the attack information from its 
vicinity nodes and reports it to the victim. If there exist 
next-level contacts, the contact sends the abnormality query 
to the next-level contact. The process is continued 
recursively. 
(4) The victim uses the information from all the contacts and 
infers the mobility of attack. In addition, a victim estimates 
the current location of attacker based on the gathered 
information. 
The spatio-temporal fusion architecture is divided into 
information gathering, and information fusion process. 
 
6.1 Information Gathering 
 
Similar to coarse-grained and fine-grained traceback, 
attack information plus age information is gathered by 
contact from vicinity nodes. More formally, spatio-temporal 
attack signature consists of (ξ, tS, tL, S). ξ is the attack 
signature that is either coarse-grained or fine-grained. S is 
the relative position of attacker (e.g., 2 hops away from 
level-1 contact i). This tuple (ξ, tS, tL, S) is effectively used to 
classify attack type (e.g., DDoS attack, mobile attack, etc). 
The contacts that observe attack signature expand the 
queries to next level contacts and other contacts suppress 
query, which results in (multi) directional information 
gathering. The difference between spatio-temporal 
architecture and coarse-grained/fine-grained traceback is 
that all the attack information from every level of contact is 
returned to the victim and the victim analyzes the 
information.   
 
6.2 Information Fusion 
 
Information fusion is the process to correlate and 
analyze the spatio-temporal information obtained through 
information gathering process. Before we describe 
information fusion process, we define two atomic 
components to detect mobile attack, namely spatial relation 
and temporal relation. Different types of attacks (e.g., 
mobile attack, DDoS attack, etc) can be effectively 
distinguished using the spatial/temporal relation. For 
instance, in mobile DoS attack, the attack signature (ξ) is 
observed in a spatially continuous manner (Fig.6 (a)). In 
general, spatial discontinuity is observed in DDoS attack as 
in Fig.6 (b). Note that DDoS attack can also show spatial 
continuity. In that case, we can distinguish DDoS attack and 
mobile DoS attack using temporal relation described later in 
this section. Note that each cell logically corresponds to 
contact vicinity in ATTENTION architecture. 
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[Figure 6] (a) Spatial continuity of mobile DoS attack. Attacker, 
A, is moving from right to left attacking victim V. (b) Spatial 
discontinuity of DDoS attack. Attackers, A1, A2, and A3 are 
launching attacks towards victim V.  
 
To quantatively formulate spatial relation, we define Spatial 
Relation Factor (SRF) as follows. 
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Nx is the total number of vicinity nodes of contact x and Ny 
is the total number of vicinity nodes of contact y. nS is the 
number of nodes that observe similar attack signature, ξ, in 
the vicinity of contact x and the vicinity of contact y. ix is a 
vicinity node of contact x and jy is a vicinity node of contact 
y. DS (ix,jy, ξ) is the hop count between node ix and jy that 
observe the attack signature ξ. The hop count information is 
obtained using underlying routing table. DS (ix,jy, ξ)=0 if 
node ix and iy do not observe the similar attack signature, ξ. 
P is the total number of tuples where DS (ix,jy, ξ)>0.  By 
high α value, we can infer that attacker is occurring near the 
central region of x’s vicinity and y’s vicinity. It is because 
more neighbors can overhear the abnormality when attacker 
passes through near the central region of the contact’s 
vicinity. When α is small, we can infer that the attacker is 
not passing through the central region of the contact’s 
vicinity or the matching report is not reliable (false 
reporting). In addition, when attacker moves from vicinity 
of x to vicinity of y, we can observe small DS  (ix,jy,ξ). 
Consequently, when x and y is not adjacent contact and ix 
and iy is far away, large DS (ix,iy,ξ) is obtained, which leads 
to low SCF.  
We classify temporal relation of attack into temporal 
continuity, temporal discontinuity, and temporal overlap as 
in Fig.7. T0, T1, and T2 are the time slot at which the attack 
is observed. In Fig.7 (a), attack signature (ξ) is observed at 
T0, T1, and T2 time slots continuously (Temporal 
continuity). On the other hand, temporal discontinuity is 
defined as in Fig.7 (b). The attack signature (ξ) is observed 
at discontinuous time slots T0 and T2. Temporal overlap 
(Fig.7(c)) implies that attack is occurring simultaneously.  
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(b) Temporal discontinuity 
 T 2  T 1  T 0  
ξ  
ξ  
 
(c) Temporal overlap 
[Figure 7]  Three types of temporal relation of attack 
 
We quantatively formulate the temporal relation as 
Temporal Relation Factor (TRF). 
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Where, ))),(),(( ξySxLT jtitD  is the difference between 
the start time (i.e., tS(iy)) when attack signature is observed 
at node iy and the last (or most recent) time (i.e., tL(ix)) when 
the attack signature is observed at ix  where tL(ix)<tS(iy). 
Under mobile attack, temporal continuity is observed and 
TRF becomes large since ))),(),(( ξySxLT jtitD becomes 
small. On the other hand, under DDoS attack, temporal 
overlap is observed and TRF becomes small value since 
))),(),(( ξySxLT jtitD becomes large.  
We use SRF and TRF metrics to infer attack type as 
follows: (I) When high SRF and high TRF is observed, we 
can infer that mobile attack has occurred. (II) When high 
SRF, and low TRF are observed, we can infer that DDoS 
attack has occurred from geographically clustered attackers. 
(Clustered DDoS attack) (III) When high SRF and 
extremely low TRF (<ε) are observed, we can infer that 
intermittent attack has occurred from clustered attackers. 
(IV) When low SRF, and high TRF are observed, we can 
infer that attack has occurred from geographically spread 
attackers with temporal continuity. (V) When low SRF and 
low TRF are observed, we can infer that DDoS attack from 
geographically spread attackers has occurred (spread DDoS 
attack). (VI) When low SRF and extremely low TRF (<ε) 
are observed, we can infer that intermittent attack has 
occurred from geographically spread attackers. Appropriate 
threshold for SRF and TRF is examined in the simulation 
section. 
In addition, the current Relative Location (RL) of 
attacker can be estimated with following equation.  
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Where, Ds(i,ci,tL(i), ξ) is the distance (hop count) between 
contact ci and its vicinity nodes, i, which observe attack 
signature at the largest (the most recent) time, 
max (tL (1),…, tL (N)). Ds(i,ci,tL(i), ξ)=0 when tL(i) ≠ max 
(tL (1),…, tL (N)). N is the number of nodes 
that observes the attack signature and Ds(i,ci,tL(i), ξ)>0. 
It estimates the relative location of attacker (i.e., number of 
hops from contact). The rational of the positioning is that 
the attacker is located approximately at the center of 
overhearing nodes. Note that RL has robustness against 
attacker’s MAC address spoofing since we do not rely on 
MAC address inscribed in frame for the positioning. 
However, it does not provide directionality. 
 We provide examples and algorithm to track down 
mobile attack based on the above classification in the 
following.  
 Mobile DoS attack 
 
Fig. 8(a) shows an example of mobile DoS attack 
detection using the TRF and SRF metrics. In the figure, 
attacker moved from region 10→9→8→7. Attack path 
from each cell is as follows: (10→6→4→2→1→v), 
(9→6→3→2→1→v), (8→5→3→2→1→v), (7→5→3→2
→1→v). A victim finds first level temporal/spatial relation 
of attack at region 3, and 4. In region 3 and region 4, high 
TRF and high SRF (4→3) are observed. At this point, we 
can infer that mobile attack is occurring. Similarly, in 
region 5 and 6, high TRF and high SRF are observed. Lastly, 
in region 7, 8, 9, 10, high TRF and SRF are observed, which 
leads us to conclude that attacker is moving and currently 
located in the region 7. Relative location of attacker is 
calculated using Eq.18 at region 7. Vertical or diagonal 
movement of attacker can be detected similarly. 
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(a) Mobile DoS attack            (b) Crossing mobile DDoS 
attack 
[Figure 8] Illustration of information fusion process for mobile 
DoS/DDoS attack detection 
 
 Mobile DDoS attack  
 
Basically, mobile DDoS attack can be detected and 
traced through separate path with the same mechanism as 
mobile DoS attacker traceback. The difficult problem in 
mobile DDoS attack occurs when two attacker are crossing 
each other as in Fig.8 (b). The crossing mobile DDoS attack 
can be detected by using TRF and SRF metrics plus the 
detection of attack signature surge. Attack signature surge is 
observed since two attack traffic are merged when crossing 
each other. For instance, in Fig.8 (b), first attacker is 
moving from 7→8→9 and the second attacker is moving 
from 11→10→9 and attack traffic is merged on the path 
from 9→6→3→2→1. Region 4, and 5 observe high SRF 
and high TRF with attack signature ξ1. Region 5, and 6 also 
observe high SRF and high TRF with attack signature ξ2. 
The relation enables us to infer mobile attack has occurred 
in region 4, 5, and 6. In addition region 5 observes the surge 
of attack traffic (≈ξ1+ξ2), which enable us to infer the cross 
of mobile attack traffic. Similarly region 7,8 and 9 observe 
high SRF and high TRF. Region 11,10, and 9 observe high 
SRF and high TRF. Region 9 observes the surge of attack 
signature. Relative location of attacker is calculated using 
Eq.18 at contact region 9. The overall algorithm to detect 
and trace mobile DDoS attack is summarized in Fig.9. 
Procedure at victim v 
STEP 1: Detect flooding-type DoS/DDoS attack. 
STEP 2: Send attack signature query to level-1 
contacts. 
STEP 3: If there are multiple signature reports from 
contacts, calculate SRF and TRF. 
STEP 4: If SRF > SRF_thresh and TRF > TRF_thresh 
between contact c1a and c1b, infer that attacker is 
moving from region c1a to region c1a. 
STEP 5: Check signature surging. If the surging exists, 
infer that multiple attackers are crossing. 
STEP 6: Wait matching report from higher level 
contact and perform SRF and TRF calculation.  
STEP 7: If there is no more report after receiving level-
N contact report, infer the current relative position of 
attack (Eq.18) at level-i contact, which has the largest 
age. 
 
Procedure at intermediate contact ci 
STEP 1: Receive attack signature query from contact  
ci-1 or victim.  
STEP 2: Gather abnormality information from its 
vicinity nodes. 
STEP 3: If abnormality exists, report the attack 
signature to the victim.  
STEP 4: If there exists contact of contact (ci+1) and 
abnormality is observed, send next-level query ci+1. 
Otherwise suppress query.  
 [Figure 9] Overall algorithm to detect mobile attack 
7. SIMULATION RESULTS  
 
We have performed extensive simulations using ns-2 to 
evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed traceback 
schemes, specifically coarse-grained traceback, fine-grained 
traceback, and spatio-temporal fusion architecture, with 
various parameter spaces. Transmission range of each node 
is set 150m and networks size is 2750mX2750m. We 
repeated each simulation 10 times in random topology and 
calculated the average value. The evaluation metrics that we 
measured in the simulation are traceback success rate, false 
positive rate, communication overhead, SRF and TRF. We 
set NoC (Number of Contacts) = 6, R (vicinity radius) = 3, r 
(contact distance) = 3, d (search depth) =5 for contact 
selection. DSDV is used as underlying routing protocol. 
DoS attacker is 17 hops away from victim, and DDoS 
attacker is 10 hops away from victim. Background traffic is 
generated with the volume of 7.5% of attack traffic (i.e., if 
attack traffic=500pps, then, background traffic=(7.5*500pp
s)/100≈38pps) from random nodes. 
 
 Coarse-grained traceback 
 
Fig.10 shows the success rate of DoS attacker 
traceback. x axis represents the percentage of nodes (out of 
1,000 nodes in the entire network) that generate background 
traffic. In frame count and, busy time, traceback success 
rate is very high when background traffic low or medium. 
However, as background traffic is increased the success rate 
is decreased due to the following reasons: (I) Abnormality 
matching level is decreased since more noise is included by 
background traffic. (II) Attack traffic does not show 
abnormal characteristics. Hence, nodes around the attack 
route cannot capture the abnormality. On the other hand, in 
collision, the traceback success rate is very low when 
background traffic is low since collision seldom occurs. 
However, as background traffic is increased the success rate 
is also increased. Then, after certain point (45%), the 
success rate decreases due to the negative noise impact of 
background traffic. When background traffic is very high 
(50%), the success rate becomes higher with collision than 
frame count and busy time. It is because the abnormal 
characteristics of collision persists longer than frame count 
and busy time. 
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[Figure 10] Traceback success rate  
 
We compared the traceback success rate between 
ATTENTION (frame count) and SWAT [13], which is 
based on traffic pattern matching. In Fig.11 ATTENTION 
shows higher success rate compared to SWAT especially 
when background traffic is increased (Avg.13.2% 
difference). It is because SWAT uses correlation of traffic 
pattern for attack signature matching and traceback. On the 
other hand, ATTENTION uses KS test for attack signature 
matching. KS test is less sensitive to traffic fluctuation than 
correlation coefficient method. In addition, ATTENTION 
is able to capture abnormality more sensitively using Eq.11. 
However, the drawback of ATTENTION is that it causes 
higher false positive rate as shown in Fig.12.  
Fig.13 shows the number of nodes around attack path 
that observes attack signature. General traceback schemes 
(e.g., PPM, iTrace, logging, SWAT, etc) rely only on the 
intermediate nodes that relayed the attack traffic for 
traceback. On the other hand, ATTENTION tracks down 
attacker utilizing the information from overhearing nodes 
around the attack path. When node density (N: average 
number of nodes within transmission range) increases, 
more nodes are able to overhear the attack signature, which 
drastically increases the robustness against node 
compromise.  
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[Figure 11] Traceback success rate comparison 
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[Figure 12] False positive rate comparison 
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[Figure 13] Robustness against node compromise 
 
 Fine-grained traceback 
 
Fig.14 shows DoS attacker traceback success rate in 
both ATTENTION Coarse-grained Traceback 
(ATTENTION-CT) scheme and ATTENTION Fine-grained 
Traceback (ATTENTION-FT) scheme. ATTENTION-FT 
shows high success rate (Avg.97%). The improvement 
becomes significant as background traffic is increased. It is 
due to the noise reduction impact as explained in Sec.5. 
Fig.15 shows DDoS attacker traceback success when there 
exist 10% of nodes that generate background traffic. SWAT 
shows very low success rate as the number of attackers is 
increased. It is because the abnormal characteristics of 
attack traffic is concealed by background traffic. 
ATTENTION-FT shows high success rate (Avg. 83%) 
since noise factors (by background traffic) are filtered out 
and abnormality of attack traffic can be effectively captured. 
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[Figure 14] DoS attacker traceback success rate comparison 
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[Figure 15] DDoS attacker traceback success rate comparison 
 
 Overhead comparison 
 
We compared communication overhead caused by 
traceback messages (number of packet transmission and 
reception). We compared ATTENTION with flooding-type 
search and ERS (Expanding Ring Search). As shown in 
Fig.16, ATTENTION incurs much less communication 
overhead than flooding and ERS. It is because query in 
ATTENTION is propagated only through the nodes that 
observe the attack signature. The overhead reduction 
becomes significant especially when the network size is 
large (74% reduction in 2500 nodes). Fig.17 shows similar 
overhead reduction for DDoS attacker traceback. Overhead 
reduction is low when network size is small and number of 
attackers is increased since ATTENTION reduces to 
flooding in such a case. However, when network size is 
large the overhead improvement becomes significant (41% 
reduction).  
 
 Mobile attacker traceback 
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[Figure 16] Overhead comparison for DoS attacker traceback 
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[Figure 17] Overhead comparison for DDoS attacker traceback 
 
We compared SCF and TRF value between DDoS attack 
and mobile DoS attack. DDoS attack is performed from 
randomly selected 6 nodes. In mobile DoS attack, attacker 
and 5% of intermediate nodes are moving with random 
waypoint mobility model (Vmax=2m/s, pause time=2.5s). 
Average SRF and TRF value are calculated where mobility 
is detected. We excluded the regions where α (Eq.16) is 
small (<0.1) since it implies that the nodes that reports 
attack signature moved out from original attack path. As 
shown in table 2, SRF is high in both in mobile attack and 
clustered DDoS attack since attack is observed in close 
region. SRF shows low value when DDoS attack is 
performed from geographically spread locations. TRF can 
differentiate between mobile attack and clustered DDoS 
attack since DDoS attack is launched around same time 
regardless of observation region. Consequently, we can 
effectively differentiate DDoS attack and mobile attack 
using combination SRF and TRF metrics (high TRF in 
mobile DoS attack and low TRF in clustered DDoS attack). 
 
[Table 2] Attack classification using SRF and TRF metrics 
 
 SRF TRF 
Mobile DoS 0.17 28.1 
Clustered DDoS 0.18 5.12x10
-3
 
Spread DDoS 0.032 5.38x10
-3
 
 
 Qualitative Comparison 
 
We provide qualitative comparison between 
ATTENTION and existing attacker traceback schemes in 
table 3. Existing IP traceback schemes are compared under 
the assumption that those are applied to MANETs. 
8. DISCUSSION  
 
 Identification of real attackers 
Using ATTENTION, we can detect the next hop node 
to attack origin. However, ATTENTION is not able to 
detect the real identity of attackers if attackers disguise both 
their IP address and MAC address. In addition, the nodes 
that generate attack packets might be compromised innocent 
nodes. However, it is still important to trace back the closest 
points to the attack origins to take appropriate actions (e.g., 
filtering, isolation, etc).   
 Trust on contact and message integrity 
In our scheme, contacts are selected independently and 
randomly by each node to prevent divulgence of contact 
information and consequent compromise. Message between 
contacts-victim, contacts-contacts, and contact-vicinity 
nodes are relayed through intermediate nodes. Malicious 
intermediate node can inject false query/report or tamper 
the integrity of the message. To provide message integrity 
and authentication, we can leverage secure protocol such as 
[14]. However, it is out of scope of this paper.  
 MAC address spoofing of relay nodes and false report 
In coarse-grained traceback, ATTENTION is not 
susceptible to MAC address spoofing by relay nodes since 
we use regional abnormality and do not rely on specific 
MAC addresses for traceback. However, in fine-grained 
traceback, if relay node (not attacker) disguises its own 
MAC address, it can cause traceback failure. In this paper, 
we assumed that relay nodes only perform its given task 
(i.e., relay) and do not perform malicious activity.  
Intermediate nodes can send false report to cause false 
positive and false negative in traceback. It can occur by 
inside attacker even if we use authentication and integrity 
protection schemes. However, our scheme can effectively 
prevent false positive/negative using majority voting. That 
is, even if some intermediate node does not report attack 
signature to cause false negative, we can still utilize 
information from other good relay/overhearing nodes that 
observes the attack signature. In addition, we ignore a report 
that does not agree with majority of reports, which prevent 
false positive.  
 Mobile attack detection 
For mobile attacker traceback, we performed limited 
simulation with simple scenario. As a future work, we will 
study and evaluate the impact of various mobility models 
[5] on traceabck success rate and overhead, etc. The 
mobility pattern (e.g., speed, direction, etc) of nodes may 
impact the success rate and efficiency of the proposed 
scheme. 
9. CONCLUSION 
 
We proposed attacker traceback protocol, 
ATTENTION, which utilizes MAC layer abnormality as 
attack signature. Under flooding type DoS/DDoS attack, 
MAC layer abnormality is observed around attack path from 
the attack origin to victim, which gives us a robust way for 
traceback. We verified that DoS attacker is successfully 
(Avg. 79%) using coarse-grained attack signature. In 
addition, with fine-grained attack signature, DoS attacker is 
traced with Avg.97% of success rate and DDoS attacker is 
traced with Avg. 83% of success rate. The communication 
overhead reduction is significant compared flooding-type 
search (74% in DoS, 41% in DDoS). We also proposed 
spatio-temporal fusion architecture to detect mobile attacker 
and verified that our architecture effectively distinguish 
DDoS attacker from mobile attacker and estimate current 
position of attacker using SRF and TRF metrics. 
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[Table 3] Qualitative analysis of traceback schemes for MANETs 
 
 Communication 
overhead 
Computation 
(Analysis) overhead 
Storage  
requirement 
Mobile attacker 
traceability 
DDoS attacker 
traceability 
Controlled flooding 
[8] 
High (short-term) Low N/A No Unable 
Packet marking 
[17][18] 
N/A High at end-host High at end-host No Poor 
itrace[7] Medium (long-term) 
 
High at end-host High at end-host No Poor 
Logging[16] Low (short-term) High at intermediate 
node 
High at  
Intermediate node 
No Good 
SWAT[12][13] Low (short-term) Low Low No Poor 
ATTENTION-CT Low (short-term) Low Low No Poor  
ATTENTION-FT Low (short-term) Low Medium No Good 
ATTENTION 
-Spatio-temporal 
fusion architecture 
Low (short-term) Low Low with CT/ 
Medium with FT 
Yes Good with FT 
 
